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[So F. No. 21908. In Bank. July 5, 1966.]

CLARENCE HONEY, Plainti1f, Cross-defendant and Respondent, V. HENRY'S FRANCHISE LEASING CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant.
[1] Vendor and Purchaser-Recovery of Purchaser's Payments.
-A wilfuly defaulting vendee may recover the excess of his
part payments over the damages caused by his breach.
[2] Id.-Recovery of Damages by Vendor.-In quieting a vendor's
title against a defaulting vendee, the trial court erred in measuring the vendor's damages by the rental value of the property
while the vendee was in possession instead of by the loss of the
benefit of the vendor's bargain.
[3] Id.-Recovery of Damages by Vendor.-On a vendee's default
in payments, the vendor properly invoked Civ. Code, § 3307,
affording the vendor the benefit of his bargain.
[4] Id.-Quieting Title.-A vendor, by seeking to quiet title
against the defaulting vendee, did not elect to rescind the contract of sale.
[6] Oontracts-Rescission-Restoration of Benefits.-When a contract is rescinded or declared unenforceable because of the
statute of frauds, the purpose of damages is to put the parties
in the position they were in before the contract rather than to
give either party the benefit of his bargain.
.
[6] Vendor and Purchaser-Rescission-By Purchaser in Default.
-When a vendee materially breaches his contract, the vendor
has an election to rescind or to enforce the contract, but the
defaulting vendee has no such election.
[7] Id.-Recovery of Damages by Vendor.-Under Civ. Code,
§ 3307, the value of property to the vendor is ordinarily the
market value of the property at the date of the defaulting
purchaser's breach, but this rule necessarily presupposes that
the vendor is free to use or dispose of the property on that
date. And where the vendee interferes with the vendor's freedom in this respect, by retaining possession or asserting an
interes* in the property, the vendor may include additional
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, § 616; Am.Jur., Vendor and Purchaser (1st ed § 524).
Kclt. Dig. References: [1] Vendor and Purchaser, § 334; [2, 3,
7] Vendor and Purchaser, § 307; [4] Vendor and Purchaser,
§ 311; [5] Contracts, § 197; [6] Vendor and Purchaser, § 233; [8]
. Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 307, 355.
I
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damages caused thereby in the amount necessary to give him
the benefit of his bargain.
[8] Id.-Recovery of Damages by Vendor: Recovery of Purchaser's
Payments-Amount of Recovery.-In an action by a defaulting
vendee to rescind the contract of purchase and a cross-action
by the vendor to quiet title, where the vendor repossessed some
of the property before trial and there was a question whether
the value of all the property at the time of trial was equal to
its value at the time of the vendee's breach plus any consequential damages that may have occurred, the vendee had the burden to prove any excess of his payments over the amount
necessary to give the vendor the benefit of his bargain.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Mateo County. Edmund Scott, Judge. Reversed in part with
directions.
Action to rescind a contract and to recover money paid;
cross-action to foreclose a vendor's lien, to recover damages
and to quiet title to real and pcrsonal property. JUdgment
quieting title in defendant, upon refunding part of payments,
reversed with directions to retry the issue of -damages only.
Heller, . Ehrman, White & McAuliffe, John P. Borgwardt
and M. Laurence Popofsky for Defendant, Cross-complainant
and Appellant.
McCloskey, Wilson, Mosher & Martin, Theodore C. Carlstrom and Roger L. Mosher for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and
Respondent.
John R. Hetland as Amicus Curiae, upon the request of
Chief Justice Traynor.
TRA YNOR, C. J.-In March 1962 plaintiff contracted to
purchase real and personal property from defendant for
$135,000. He paid $25,000 down and agreed to pay $845 per
month until the total price was paid. Plaintiff made the
monthly payments until February 1963. He then brought this
action to rescind the contract for material misrepresentation of
fact and to recover what he had paid. Defendant answered and
cross-complained. It denied that plaintiff was entitled to rescission and sought to establish and foreclose a vendor's lien, to
recover damages, and to quiet title. The trial court found that
there was no basis for rescission and that plaintiff was in
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default. It entered judgment quieting title in defendant on
condition that it pay to plaintiff $16,575, the sum found to be
the difference between the $33,450 plaintiff paid under the
contract and the rental value ·of the property while it was in
plaintiff's possession. Defendant appeals, contending that the
trial court erred in requiring it to refund any of the payments.
[1] Even a wilfully defaulting vendee may recover the
excess of his part payments over the damages caused by his
breach. (Freedman v. The Rector, 37 Ca1.2d 16, 22-23 [230
P.2d 629, 31 A.L.R.2d 1] ; see also Caplan v. Schroeder, 56
Ca1.2d 515, 519 [15 Cal.Rptr. 145, 364 P.2d 321], and cases
cited.) [2] We agree with defendant's contention that the
trial court erred in measuring its damages under this rule by
the rental value of the property while plaintiff was in possession instead of by the loss of the benefit of defendant'8
bargain. (See Civ. Code, § 3307 .)1 Since the trial court found
that the fair market value of the property at the time of the
trial was $90,000, defendant contends that the difference between the contract price of $135,000 and the fair market value
of the property exceeded plaintiff's part payments of $33,450.
The rule of the Freedman case precludes penalties and forfeitures by denying the vendor the right on the vendee's default to retain both the property and any payments that have
been made in excess of the actual damages caused by the default. The Freedman case, however, did not restrict the right
of a vendor t6 realize the benefit of his bargain. (See Baffa v.
Johnson, 35 Ca1.2d 36, 39 [216 P.2d 13] ; Barkis v. Scott, 34
Ca1.2d 116, 120-121 [208 P.2d 367].) Instead, it invoked the
provisions of the Civil Code governing damages to determine
the amount of the vendee's recovery. (37 Ca1.2d at pp. 2122.) [3] Since section 3307 affords the vendor the benefit of
his bargain on the vendee's dcfault, defendant properly invokes it in this case.
[4] By seeking to quiet title, defendant has not elected to
rescind the contract. (Barkis v. Scott, 34 Ca1.2d 116, 120-121
[208 P.2d 367], and cases cited.) [5] When a contract is
1" The detriment caused by the breach of an agreement to purchase an
estate in real property, is deemed to be the excess, if any. of the amount
which would have been due to the seller, under the contract, over the
value of the property to him." The value of the property to the seller
is ordinarily the fair market value of the property at the time of the
breach. (Royer v. Carter, 3i Cal.2d M4, 548·550 [233 P.~d 539]; Baffa
v. Johnson, 35 Cal.2d 36,39·40 [216 P.2d 131; Employees' Part'icipating
..ISBn. v. Pine, 91 Cal.App.2d :!U9, 301 [204 P.2tl 965].)
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rescinded or declared unenforceable because of the statute of
frauds, the purpose of damages is to put the parties in the
position they were in before the contract rather .than to give
either party the benefit of his bargain. (Heintzsch v. LaFrance, 3 Ca1.2d 180, 182-183 [44 P.2d 358] ; Roberts v. Lebrain, 113 Cal.App.2d 712, 716-717 [248 P.2d 810].) [6]
When a vendee has materially breached his contract, the vendor has an election to rescind or to enforce the contract. (See
. Bird v. Kenworthy, 43 Cal.2d 656, 660 [217 P.2d 1] ; Luz v.
Lopes, 55 Ca1.2d 54, 61 [10 Cal.Rptr. 161, 358 P.2d 289];
Behrendt v. Abraham, ante, pp. 182, 188 [49 Cal.Rptr. 292,
410 P.2d 828].) The defaulting vendee, however, has no such
election. Otherwise, the contract of sale would in effect be a
lease with an option to purc]lase. The vendee would receive the
benefit of any increase in the value of the property, and the
vendor would bear the entire risk of any decrease in its value.
Such protection to a defau]ting vendee would go beyond that
provided by anti-defieiency legis]ation, which places the risk of
depreciation in value on the vendor only to the extent that the
"alue of the property may decrease below the amount still
owing·on the contract. (Code Civ. Proc., § 580b; see Roseleaf
Corp. v. O1~ierighino, 59 Ca1.2d 35, 42 [27 Cal.Rptr. 873, 378
P.2d 97].)
Amicus curiae urges that the remedies for breaches of landsale contracts .should be reconsidered in the light of the distinct purposes such contracts serve. He points out that remedies that are appropriate for the breach of a buy-sell or marketing contract may not be appropriate for the breach of an installment contract entered into primarily as a security device.
Since rules precluding forfeitures and anti-deficieney legislation have put the latter type of contracts substantially on a
par in many respects with mortgages and deeds of trust, amicus curiae suggests that the law governing those security devices should be adopted with appropriate modifications in
determining the remedies for breaches of installDlent contracts.
On the vendee's breach, neither the vendee nor the vendor
would have an election to rescind the contract, on the ground
that rescission in effeet con\'{'rts a o(>ht S{,C'lll'C'O hythe pronerty into a lease of the property, a result. not contemplated by
either of the parties. In his view, the appropriate remedy is a
judicia] sale of the property, which will afford the vendor the
benefit of his bargain to the extent not precluded by the pro.
hibition against deficiency judgments (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 580b) and return to thc velldee any excess of his part payments over the damages caused by his breach.
., !
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In the present case, however, the vendor is not seeking to
rescind the contract, and neither party seek~ a judicial sale of
the property to fix damages. Under these circumstances it is
unnecessary to consider possib)e alternatives to the remedy
recognized in the Barkis, Baffa, and Freedman cases of quieting the vendor's title on condition that he refund the excess,
if any, of the payments received over the amount necessary to
give him the benefit of his bargain.
Although the trial court found that the fair market value of
the property was $90,000 at the time of the trial, we cannot
conclude that defendant's damages exceeded plaintiff's payments and that plaintiff is therefore entitled to no recovery.
[7] Under section 3307 the value of tIle property to the
seller is ordinarily the market value of the property at the
date of the breach. (Royer v. Carter, 37 Clil.2d 544, 549-550
[233 P.2d 539].) This rule necessarily presupposes that the
vendor is free to use or dispose of the property on tIl at date.
Accordingly, if the vendee lIas interfered with the vendor's
freedom in this respect, by retaining possession or asserting an
interest in the property, the vendor may include any additional damages caused thereby in the amount necessary to give
him the benefit of his bargain. (See Royer v. Carter, 37 Cal.2d
544, 550 [233 P.2d 539].) [8] In the present casc, defendant repossessed some of the property before trial, and it is
impossible to determine from the record whether the value of
all of the property at the time of the trial was equal to its
value at the time of the breach plus any consequential damages that may have been incurred. On retrial the burden will
be on plaintiff to prove the excess, if any, of his payments over
the amount necessary to give defendant the benefit of his bargain. (Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Ca1.2d 36, 39-40 [216 P.2d 13] ;
Barkis v. Scott, 34 Ca1.2d 116, 120 [208 P.2d 367].)
No error appears except in the trial court's determination
of the issue of damages. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed
with directions to 'retry the issue of damages only and to enter
the appropriate judgment.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and
Burke, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied August
17,1966.

